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I. INTRODUCTION
By enacting a $1 million debt limit for deductible home mortgage
interest in 1987,' Congress opened the way for a fresh inquiry into the
home property tax deduction. Adoption of that debt limit reflects a ma-
jor change in policy-a re-evaluation of the benefits and costs of subsi-
dies to luxury housing.
At first glance a $1 million limit seems ridiculously high if the debt
ceiling reflects a decision to stop subsidizing luxury housing. The debt
ceiling, however, does not contain an inflation adjustment provision.
Because such provisions are common in the Internal Revenue Code, the
absence here must be by conscious design. Political pressures no doubt
required a debt ceiling to debut at a token level and slowly grow by
inflation into a meaningful limit. Already, inflation has achieved a sig-
nificant step that Congress apparently wanted but lacked the courage
to take.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; visiting at Santa Clara
University School of Law 1990-91; J.D., University of Michigan, 1981; LL.M. (Taxation), New
York University, 1986. I am grateful for the use of the Notre Dame Law Library while I wrote this
Article, and for the efforts of my research assistant, David Miller, J.D., University of Nebraska,
1990.
1. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,102, 101 Stat. 1330-
384, 1330-385 (amending § 163(h) of the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter Code]).
2. To illustrate, a $1 million ceiling in August 1990 is equivalent to an $855,000 ceiling in
August 1987, the effective date of the provision, in real terms. If the increase in housing costs
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This change in policy calls for a re-evaluation of the property tax
deduction. In general, mortgage interest and property tax on a principal
residences are economically analogous costs of purchasing a home.
Neither is appropriately deductible as a matter of defining net income,
but both are deductible as concessions based on nontax policy. If de-
duction of home mortgage interest is to be limited, consistency requires
that deduction of home property tax also be limited.4
This Article develops a proposal to limit the federal income tax de-
duction for home property tax. Under the proposal, no more than $5000
of property tax on a principal residence will be deductible, and no de-
duction will be allowed to any taxpayer with adjusted gross income
(AGI) greater than $250,000. The Article determines that a theoreti-
cally pure definition of taxable income would not allow any deduction
for home property tax payments, but that certain social policies are fur-
thered by the deduction. Analysis of those social policies reveals that
they can be fulfilled by a limited deduction, thereby reducing the cost
and increasing the cost efficiency of promoting such policies.
II. HOME PROPERTY TAX IN A THEORETICAL DEFINITION OF INCOME
Among authors who address a theoretical definition of income, a
strong consensus holds that rental value of an owner-occupied home
should be included in the owner's gross income. If gross income from
rental value is imputed to a homeowner, deductions for home property
tax, home mortgage interest, repairs, and depreciation are considered
appropriate as expenses of earning the imputed income. As a result,
only net rental value is taxed, as with an arm's-length landlord. But
imputed income from owner-occupied housing never has been included
within the reach of our federal income tax.' If gross rental value is not
during the above period continues, by August 1996, a $1 million limit will be equivalent to a
$626,000 ceiling in August 1987. These figures are based on increases in home ownership costs,
rather than general inflation. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvISERS FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM.,
101ST CONG., 2D SESS., ECONOMIC INDICATORS 23 (Sept. 1988 & Oct. 1990).
3. Hereinafter, for convenience, these will be referred to respectively as "home mortgage in-
terest" and "home property tax."
4. By analogy, the 1986 repeal of deductions for sales tax and for nonhome, nonbusiness
interest argues persuasively that nonhome, nonbusiness property tax also should be nondeductible.
This argument applies to both real property tax, such as that on a vacation home, and personal
property tax. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2116
(sales tax), § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2246 (nonhome, nonbusiness interest) [hereinafter 1986 Tax
Act]. In this Article I discuss only home property tax issues, although I do note that nonhome,
nonbusiness property tax deductions should be eliminated for reasons similar to those developed
herein.
5. See, e.g., H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXTION: Tan DEFINITION OF INCOME As A PROB-
LEM OF FISCAL POLICY 112-22 (1938); W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIvE TAXATION 18-24 (1947).
6. The Wisconsin state income tax included such income for a few years early in this cen-
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imputed to an owner, definitional justification for deducting home
property tax is lost.
David Bradford's book, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform,7 begins
its discussion of a deduction for nonbusiness property tax with the issue
of imputed income from rental value of nonbusiness property. While
accepting the economic reality of such income, Blueprints advises
against including it in gross income for tax purposes "[p]rimarily for
the sake of simplification."' A property tax deduction, however, would
cause a further understatement of income. Because such a deduction
would discriminate against tenants, the Blueprints' model tax allows no
deduction for property taxes on owner-occupied homes.9
The best known American author on income definition, Henry
Simons, unfortunately did not address specifically a nonbusiness prop-
erty tax deduction in his treatise on the definition of income.10 Henry
Aaron interprets Simons's definition of income to be before other taxes
are imposed, that is, without deduction for nonbusiness tax.11 Aaron in-
cludes the home property tax deduction in his Inventory of 'Existing
Tax Incentives.1 2 Richard Goode discusses Simons's definition and de-
termines that "[1]iterally, the . . . definition applies to income net of
direct personal taxes; however, it has generally been interpreted to
mean income before personal taxes, or perhaps more accurately no ac-
count has been taken of the existence of personal taxes."
13
William Vickrey, writing ten years after Simons, opposed a non-
business property tax deduction on theoretical grounds. In support of '
his assertion that no deduction be allowed, Vickrey states that
"[e]limination of this unwarranted deduction for taxes will considerably
reduce the disparity between the tax burdens of homeowners and ten-
ants, and will introduce no new disparities.' ' He further argues that
eliminating the property tax deduction is theoretically more sound than
eliminating the home mortgage interest deduction, another often-criti-
cized itemized deduction. 5
tury. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERPL INCOME TAX
14-15 (R. Haig ed. 1921). England taxed it until 1963. Hellmuth, Homeowner Preferences, in COM-
PREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 170 (J. Pechman ed. 1977).
7. D. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAX REFORM (2d ed. 1984).
8. Id. at 78.
9. Id. at 79.
10. See generally H. SIMONS, supra note 5.
11. See Aaron, What Is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 543, 543-45
(1969).
12. Aaron, Inventory of Existing Tax Incentives-Federal, in TAX INCENTIVES 42-44 (1971).
13. Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIWE INCOME TAXATON, supra
note 6, at 17 (footnote omitted).




A contrary concern often mentioned in support of the deduction of
state and local taxes is that the absence of a deduction could produce a
combined tax rate in excess of one hundred percent.16 This concern first
arose in connection with state and local income taxes, in situations in
which two or more authorities are using one tax base. When moved to a
property tax discussion, however, this concern loses much of its coher-
ence because the two governments are using different and unrelated tax
bases. Furthermore, as reported in a tax reform proposal of the United
States Department of Treasury17 in 1984 (Treasury I), "Given the pres-
ent levels of tax rates, such an argument is no longer relevant."'
In a 1985 article Brookes Billman and Noel Cunningham criticize a
proposal, found in both Treasury I and its subsequent modification
(Treasury II), to eliminate all deductions for nonbusiness state and lo-
cal taxes.' Their comments are directed primarily to Treasury II, but
are applicable to Treasury I as well. They begin from the Haig-Simons
definition of income as consumption plus net saving.20 Because statu-
tory gross income is calculated from money income plus certain in-kind
receipts, rather than by direct counting of consumption and saving
transactions, expenditures that are neither consumption nor saving
must be deducted from statutory gross income to produce a taxable in-
come figure that conforms to the Haig-Simons definition.
Certainly state and local tax payments are not savings. To charac-
terize a tax payment as consumption, the simplest approach is to con-
clude that a taxpayer receives government services equal in value to the
tax paid. If so, the tax payment can be seen as a forced purchase of
With interest on home mortgages the case is not quite so clear cut. While eliminating the
deduction of such explicit interest without taxing the imputed interest on equities would re-
duce the disparity between the tenant and the homeowner with a thin equity, it will not
reduce the disparity between the tenant and the owner of an unencumbered home, and it will
actually introduce new disparities among homeowners having differing equities in their
residences.
Id. at 22-23.
16. See Billman & Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local Taxes: The Case for Deduct-
ibility, 28 TAx NOTES 1107, 1116 (1985).
17. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, TAx REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLIcrrY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEP'T REPORT TO THE PRESMENT (1984) [hereinafter TREA-
SURY I].
18. Id. vol. 1, at 78. Treasury I is a thoughtful and valuable analysis by tax policy profession-
als at the Treasury Department concerning United States tax law as it was and as it could be.
President Reagan's tax proposal to Congress embodied a later version of Treasury I, modified by
political professionals to suit the political agenda and realities of that era. See THE PREsmENT's
TAx PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SmPLicrry (1985) [hereinafter TRzA-
SURY H].
19. See Billman & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1107; see also TREASURY I, supra note 17,
at 78-81; TREASURY H, supra note 18, at 62-69.
20. See H. SIMONS, supra note 5, at 50; Haig, supra note 6, at 5-6. As used here, saving
includes both saving and investment, as those terms are defined in a narrow, technical sense.
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services from state and local governments for personal consumption.
Many people, however, pay more in state and local taxes than they re-
ceive in state and local benefits. The excess of payment over benefits
received cannot be characterized as a consumptive purchase of services.
Unfortunately, in their analysis of whether state and local tax pay-
ments represent consumption, Billman and Cunningham pursue only
this method of characterization. Applying the Haig-Simons definition to
their analysis, they conclude that the portion of tax paid that is equal
to the value of benefits received represents consumption and, therefore,
income. The excess of state and local taxes paid over benefits received,
however, is not consumption and, therefore, not income and must be
deducted. 21 Rather than construct a partial deduction mechanism that
would allow deduction only of the amount (or the estimated amount) of
this excess payment, Billman and Cunningham posit "no deduction"
and "full deduction" as the two available solutions.22 Faced with these
options, they choose the latter. 3
The first flaw in the Billman and Cunningham approach is their
uncritical adoption of the failure of Treasury II to differentiate be-
tween different types of state and local taxes. 24 The second and more
significant flaw is their view that the only possible consumptive charac-
terization of state and local taxes is as a forced purchase of government
services.
2 5
State and local income taxes should be considered separate from
property tax.26 Separation allows for inquiry into the taxpayer's actions
or behavior that produced a tax obligation. An income tax, then, can be
seen as a tax on, and therefore a cost of, earning income. Analogy to a
business expense is so strong that an economically sound definition of
net income, rather than nontax social policy reasons, requires a deduc-
tion for state and local income taxes.27 Sound theory would make it a
21. See Billman & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1113.
22. Id. Billman and Cunningham mention John Due's partial deduction idea, id. at 1113
n.23, but Due proposes only a partial deduction of state and local income taxes (above a 2% AGI
floor), with no deduction for sales tax and full deduction for property tax. See Due, Personal
Deductions, in COMPREHNSiW INcoME TAxATiON, supra note 6, at 37, 51-52. For a proposal of a
nondeductible dollar amount floor under combined state and local income, sales, and property
taxes, see McCombs, A New Federal Tax Treatment of State and Local Taxes, 19 PAc. L.J. 747
(1988).
23. Billman & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1113-14.
24. Id. at 1111-12.
25. Id.
26. Sales tax was deductible in 1985, at the time of the Billman and Cunningham article, and
they included it in their discussion of tax types. After the 1986 Tax Act, sales tax is not deductible
so it is not addressed here. See 1986 Tax Act, supra note 4, § 134(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2116. But if
it still were deductible, it would be subject to my discussion of property tax for this purpose.
27. See Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax, 66 CORNaL.L L. RaV.
1991]
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deduction in calculating AGI rather than an itemized deduction. A
property tax on one's home, however, is a tax on, and therefore a cost
of, consumption."
Given that characterization, an inquiry into whether a homeowner
receives government services equal to property tax paid is unneces-
sary.29 Property tax is an integral part of the cost of owning a home,
and it is not fundamentally different from the cost of mowing the lawn,
which is not deductible. Further, it is unnecessary to inquire whether
tax payment was involuntary in the sense that the homeowner voted
against the tax, in the less direct sense that some minimum level of
housing is a functional necessity, or in the specious sense proposed by
Treasury I that a taxpayer could move to a place with lower taxes. 0
Many involuntary consumption expenditures are not deductible."1 In
some cities, lawn mowing is mandated by an aesthetics ordinance, yet
its cost does not thereby become deductible. The Haig-Simons defini-
tion of income makes no distinction based on voluntariness. Consump-
tion, such as home property taxes, and savings constitute income and
are not deductible from money income. The costs of producing income,
262, 267-68 (1981). In a relevant article, Professor Stanley Surrey comments:
[W]e can here see the importance of distinguishing tax expenditures and tax incentives-so-
called special tax provisions-from those provisions considered a proper and necessary part of
the structure of an income tax.. . . It thus is necessary to the rationale of that tax to provide
the deductions from gross income required to produce the net income base of the tax. Those
deductions, generally speaking, are the expenses and costs incurred in the process of produc-
ing or earning the gross income received by the taxpayer.
Surrey, Tax Incentives-Conceptual Criteria for Identification and Comparison with Direct Gov-
ernment Expenditures, in TAx INcENTWEs, supra note 12, at 23.
In July 1990 the Bush Administration leaked its tentative thoughts on limiting the deduction
of state and local income taxes to $10,000. This idea was at odds with economic theory and was not
designed to further any nontax social policy, so its demise was not surprising. See Rosenbaum, A
Tax Debate Revived, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1990, § 1, pt. 1, at 1, col. 5.
28. For tentative support of this assertion, see Turnier, supra note 27, at 274-75. A property
tax could be seen as an income tax on imputed income from use of one's home, but if characterized
in this way, it becomes a cost of earning tax exempt income. It should then be nondeductible
under the policy of § 265 of the Code, which prohibits a deduction for expenses incurred to earn
tax exempt income. I.R.C. § 265 (1989).
29. If one is searching for an economic quid pro quo for a homeowner's property tax, con-
sider that the homeowner probably bought the home at a substantial discount from its cost in a
taxless world, due to the implicit lien of the property tax obligation. So each year's property tax
payment, to the extent it does not exceed the level anticipated by the market at time of purchase,
resembles a payment to a third party for the value of that discount.
30. TnF sURy I, supra note 17, vol. 2, at 63. One might defend deductibility of state and local
taxes on the ground that payment is involuntary. Involuntariness, however, should not be the test
of deductibility. Furthermore, an assertion that home property tax is involuntary cannot be ac-
cepted. If it were, then the performance of every binding obligation that is undertaken voluntarily
becomes an involuntary act. The purchase of a home is a voluntary act, and so are all the obliga-
tions that were known to attach to that initial act.
31. My research assistant, David Miller, deserves credit for helping me to see that this volun-
tary-involuntary issue is a red herring.
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such as state and local income taxes, are not income and, therefore, are
deductible.
III. FEDERALISM POLICY FAILS TO OVERRIDE ECONOMIC THEORY
Discussions of a federal deduction for state and local tax payments
frequently mention a federalism policy that favors deductibility. Feder-
alism refers to cooperative interaction of the federal government and its
law with state and local governments and their laws. The history of the
creation of our country depicts an intended sharing of power between
state and federal governments that is more balanced than is required by
the Constitution. In attempting to follow the spirit rather than the let-
ter of the Constitution, the federal government often exercises its broad
constitutional powers in a manner deferential to the states.32
In taxation, this federalism policy favors a federal deduction for all
state and local taxes. A legitimate concern is that deduction of some,
but not all, types of state and local taxes will place an inappropriate
pressure on jurisdictions that utilize nondeductible taxes. Residents of
these jurisdictions will bear a heavier net tax burden than similarly sit-
uated residents of states and cities using deductible taxes. One way to
eliminate such discrimination is to deny deduction of all types of state
and local taxes. As a matter of sound tax policy, however, state and
local income taxes must be deducted in calculating a definitionally le-
gitimate net income.3 3 They are an ordinary and necessary cost of earn-
ing income. Nondeductibility of all tax types, therefore, is not an
acceptable solution. If deduction of state income tax is allowed, federal-
ism policy favors a deduction for all types of state taxes.
At the inception of our constitutional income tax in 1913, all state
and local tax payments were deductible, except improvement assess-
ments. 4 In the Revenue Act of 1934, the deduction for state gift and
inheritance tax was eliminated.3 5 The Revenue Act of 1964 changed the
statutory approach from one allowing deduction of all state and local
taxes except those listed, to one allowing only a specific listing of de-
ductible tax types.3 6 As a result, driver's license fees, other state and
local license fees, and tobacco and alcohol taxes became nondeductible.
A 1972 amendment eliminated the deduction for motor vehicle sales tax
to the extent that it was imposed at a higher rate than general sales tax
32. See Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the
Founders' Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AN. CraM. L. REv.
1261, 1261-64 (1989).
33. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34. See Tariff Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
35. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 23(c)(3), 48 Stat. 680, 688.
36. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 207(a), 78 Stat. 19, 40.
1991]
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in that jurisdiction. 7 The Revenue Act of 1978 repealed the deduction
for state and local motor fuel taxes.5 5 Most recently, in 1986 deduction
of the sales tax was eliminated. 9
History reveals a relentless constriction of deductions for state and
local taxes. Federalism policy favoring broad deductibility to avoid dis-
crimination has been overridden so many times that it has become a
hollow argument. It provides an excuse for keeping a deduction that
really is being maintained for other reasons, perhaps only by political
inertia.
Repeal of the sales tax deduction tolled the final bell for this feder-
alism policy argument. Nondeductibility of local improvement assess-
ments can be defended because they are charges for benefits received
by property owners rather than taxes in the truest sense. Repeal of the
gasoline tax deduction was based on a valid argument that the gasoline
tax was not a true tax, but merely a convenient means of imposing a
road use fee.40 Cigarette and alcohol taxes are not deductible because
their purpose is to discourage consumption of those products. A deduc-
tion would reduce the intended force of such taxes. No such explana-
tions are available for the repeal of a sales tax deduction. Sales tax is a
broad-based tax, adopted to provide large amounts of general revenue.
Because four states have no general sales tax,4' federalism concerns
about discrimination among states choosing different revenue sources is
- strongest with respect to sales tax. In contrast, because real property
taxes are used widely in every state, the discrimination argument favor-
ing their deduction is much weaker. In its strongest case, then, the dis-
crimination argument failed.
Another argument stemming from federalism policy could be based
on the assumed inappropriateness of federal pressure exerted against a
state revenue source in a more general sense, regardless of whether the
pressure is discriminatory. In this view, the strength of federalism pol-
icy favoring deductibility would grow in proportion to the amount of
deductible revenue raised by a particular tax. For purposes of this Arti-
cle and proposal, those itemized deductions for real property tax that
will be eliminated should be compared to those itemized deductions for
sales tax that were eliminated in 1986.42 Tax payments deducted as
37. Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-580, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 1276, 1277.
38. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 111, 92 Stat. 2763, 2777.
39. 1986 Tax Act, supra note 4, § 134, 100 Stat. 2085, 2116.
40. D. BRADFORD, supra note 7, at 80.
41. TREASURY I, supra note 17, vol. 2, at 68.
42. As mentioned earlier, nonhome, nonbusiness real and personal property taxes should be
completely nondeductible, but those tax categories are outside the scope of this Article. See supra
note 4.
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business or investment expenses, and those not deducted because the
payor does not itemize, will be unaffected by this proposal. In 1986, the
last year in which sales tax was deductible, $27.9 billion of sales tax was
deducted.4 s Itemized deductions for nonbusiness real property tax by
taxpayers with AGIs above $200,000 totalled $1.8 billion."" If general
pressure on state revenue sources from repeal of the sales tax deduction
was within acceptable bounds, the pressure from the proposal set forth
in this Article will be de minimis.
IV. HOUSING POLICY OVERRIDES ECONOMIC THEORY
David Bradford, a tax reform commentator, has asserted that
"[e]limination of the [property tax] deduction would . . . reduce the
tax bias in favor of housing investment in general, and owner-occu-
pancy in particular." '45 Despite a theoretical argument that deduction of
home property tax should not be allowed in calculating taxable income,
one must consider whether other social policies justify an intentional
tax bias in favor of owner-occupied housing. The home property tax
deduction has been authorized throughout our income tax history.46 A
paucity of legislative history leaves unclear the original reason for this
deduction. In recent years, though, a social policy of encouraging home
ownership frequently has been identified as the force supporting deduc-
tion. The deduction for home mortgage interest shares this motivating
social policy.
47
Numerous social benefits are believed to flow from home owner-
ship. Homeowners move less often than renters.48 Parents may be in-
duced to take a greater interest in the school system. Voter turnout 9
43. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. Dzp'T OF TREAsURY, PUB. No. 1304, STATISTICS OF IN-
comz-1986, INDVmuAL INcomz TAx RETURNS 64 (Table 2.1) (1989).
44. Id. Of the referenced amount, those deductions that were for vacation or other nonhome
properties will be eliminated for reasons mentioned supra at notes 4 and 42. Some of the home
property tax deductions in the $200,000 to $250,000 AGI range still will be deductible under the
phaseout provision discussed infra at notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Furthermore, some of
the $35.3 billion of itemized, nonbusiness real property tax deductions by taxpayers below $200,000
AGI will be lost to this proposal's $5000 ceiling, and some will be denied by a related objection to
deduction of property tax on vacation properties. Nevertheless, the $1.8 billion figure in the text
accurately portrays the general magnitude of deductions affected by this proposal.
All itemizing taxpayers deducted $2.5 billion of personal property tax, which would be disal-
lowed by the parallel thinking discussed supra at notes 4, 42, and accompanying text.
45. D. BRsFoan, supra note 7, at 79.
46. See Billman & Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1108 & n.3.
47. "[E]ncouraging home ownership is an important policy goal, achieved in part by provid-
ing a deduction for residential mortgage interest." S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 804 (1986).
48. Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout, 81 Am. POL. SCL
REv. 45, 48-49 (1987).
49. Id. at 52.
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and other forms of local political involvement increase.50 Owners main-
tain their homes better than renters and landlords, thus providing aes-
thetic benefits to neighbors. 1 Better maintenance of homes also
supports local real estate prices, thereby likely increasing motivation of
nearby owners to improve and maintain their property and motivation
of lenders to finance such activities.
The least articulable social policy favoring home ownership, but
certainly the most significant, is that owning one's home is a fundamen-
tal part of the "American Dream." Attaining that goal primarily bene-
fits the individual, but a widespread perception that each individual has
a good chance of attaining the goal is considered a social benefit. A high
rate of home ownership helps persuade those who currently are unable
to own that they have a chance to own a home. 2
All these social benefits seem to be advanced by government pro-
grams that make it easier to own a home. Nevertheless, society suffers
certain detriments from its decision to maintain owner-occupied hous-
ing above a free market level. Equity and debt capital are pulled away
from more productive alternate uses, thus lowering the gross national
product and raising capital costs to other sectors of the economy. A
sector of production that cannot be exported is expanded-partially at
the expense of other, exportable production-with negative conse-
quences to our balance of payments. Tax deductions granted to en-
courage home ownership reduce aggregate taxable income, thereby
requiring higher rates to achieve desired revenue, which, in turn, inten-
sifies the distortions and other problems inevitably caused by an in-
come tax. 3 Funds used or revenue foregone to help taxpayers move
from a nice rental to a nice owned home might be used more produc-
tively to help poorer people move from a squalid rental to a tolerable
rental. One might surmise that the desirability of tenants increases with
their income. If so, converting middle-class tenants to homeowners de-
creases the percentage of "good" tenants in the rental market, reduces
the general attractiveness of rental housing as an investment or a ca-
reer, and increases rents for those who remain tenants. Home owner-
ship decreases mobility of labor and increases costs of moving to a new
50. Alford & Scoble, Sources of Local Political Involvement, 62 AM. POL. SCL Rav. 1192,
1197-99 (1968).
51. Galster, Empirical Evidence on Cross-Tenure Differences in Home Maintenance and
Conditions, 59 LAND ECON. 107, 110-12 (1983).
52. Of course, one should not ignore the purely political forces behind government housing
assistance. Lenders, builders, and realtors have strong self-interests in programs that keep housing
supply above its free market level, and their lobbying efforts are well organized and well financed.
At this point, however, the Article attempts to identify legitimate social policies behind expanded
home ownership opportunities.
53. W. VicKRRY, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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job at a distant location. These negative effects receive very little atten-
tion in discussions of a social policy favoring home ownership.
In any event, positive and negative considerations have led Con-
gress to conclude that allowing tax deductions which increase home
ownership are more important than following a theoretically pure defi-
nition of income. It is important to note that such a conclusion might
reflect an optimal balancing of policy considerations. This Article pro-
ceeds generally as if it does. Certainly, theoretical definitions and free
market forces do not always lead to optimal results.
V. SUBSIDY ANALYSIS
Only after the force behind the home property tax deduction has
been identified clearly as a social policy of encouraging home ownership
can the deduction be analyzed constructively. The analysis will be
clearer if the "encouragement" is explicitly acknowledged and ad-
dressed as a subsidy." For political reasons, this candid label often is
avoided.
Subsidy analysis is neither new nor arcane. The government's goal
must be precisely determined and described. A clear statement of what
is not intended also may be important. An existing subsidy program
then can be subjected to cost-benefit analysis by proposing changes in
its terms and estimating the increase or decrease in costs and benefits
from these changes. Typically, costs are measured directly in money
spent or, as here, in revenue foregone, while benefits must be measured
subjectively. Even though a completely objective evaluation cannot be
achieved, methodical analysis can clarify the subjective benefits likely
to be gained or lost by a proposed change, thereby improving the deci-
sion-making process. As Stanley Surrey said twenty years ago, "These
methods are being utilized more and more to devise and test direct ex-
penditures, and they should a priori be equally applicable to programs
using a tax incentive technique.
5 5
The general goal of this subsidy apparently is to increase the rate
of home ownership. Qualification of high-income taxpayers for this sub-
sidy raises two questions. The first concerns goal definition. Assuming
for a moment that this subsidy will increase the rate of home ownership
among high-income individuals, is such an increase a part of the gov-
54. Treasury I acknowledges:
The U.S. income tax is not used simply to raise revenue. Instead, it is used to subsidize a long
list of economic activities through exclusions from income subject to tax, adjustments to in-
come, business deductions unrelated to actual expenses, deferral of tax liability, deductions
for personal consumption expenditures, tax credits, and preferential tax rates.
T n suRy I, supra note 17, vol. 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
55. Surrey, supra note 27, at 3, 14.
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ernment's housing policy goal? Should it be?
High-income people financially are able to purchase homes without
a subsidy. Those high-income individuals who, in absence of this sub-
sidy, would not purchase a home likely would have based their housing
decision on other factors such as a greater satisfaction from alternative
consumption expenditures, a greater return on alternative investments,
or a desire for mobility. The former factor is one that national housing
policy might want to overcome. The latter two would produce benefits
to the nation's economy and, therefore, are at odds with a subsidy that
operates to convert satisfied, high-income tenants to homeowners.
A second concern about granting the subsidy to high-income tax-
payers is based on cost-benefit analysis and consists of two parts. First,
continue to assume that the subsidy has its intended effect in this in-
come class. Society's benefits from home ownership56 decrease as in-
come rises. High-income tenants probably demand and get the same
level of home exterior maintenance from their landlords as owners in
the same income range obtain for their homes. 7 The neighborhoods
where high-income tenants live have sufficient owner and lender sup-
port for improvements and repairs. Finally, if we have a national policy
favoring a widespread perception that the American Dream is attain-
able, the homes of most high-income tenants will do their part to en-
courage middle- and low-income people to persevere.
Society's benefits from encouraging tenants to buy homes decrease
with rising income, but society's costs increase. Because this subsidy is
delivered through a tax deduction, its value to the taxpayer and its cost
to the government increase as the recipient's income and tax rate in-
crease. Congress has placed no limitation on the amount of the deduc-
tion. Because high-income people tend to own more expensive and,
therefore, more heavily taxed homes, subsidy costs increase with
income.
The foregoing analysis of granting this subsidy to high-income tax-
payers focuses on the costs and benefits involved when one individual
converts from renting to owning. A second cost-benefit concern involves
the inefficiency of giving this subsidy to high-income taxpayers as a
whole. In the process of convincing one tenant to buy a home, how
much subsidy is paid to people who would have bought their homes
without a subsidy? How valid is the assumption of the last several
paragraphs that this subsidy increases home ownership among high-in-
56. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
57. Based on 1975 figures, Professor George Galster found that the most significant gap be-
tween owner-occupied and rented housing maintenance was at income levels below $11,000. Gal-
ster, supra note 51, at 111.
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come individuals?
For people who financially are able to purchase a nice home, psy-
chological and economic motivations to do so are very strong. The abili-
ties to decorate and landscape a home and to stay as long as desired are
attractive to most people. Ownership eliminates the risk of rent in-
creases. Upscale homes tend to appreciate in value, often at a signifi-
cant rate. Gain on the sale of a home often qualifies for a tax deferral 5e
that eventually can be converted to a permanent escape from tax for up
to $125,000 if sold after the owner reaches age fifty-five." Subject to a
generous limit, home mortgage interest is deductible.60 Although most
taxpayers probably are not familiar with the theory of imputed income
from owner-occupied housing, they do know that if their home equity
was placed in arm's-length investments, the profit would be taxed
before it could be used to pay rent.6 1 At the same time, the subsidy to
tenants that was produced in the early 1980s by the highly accelerated
depreciation of rental housing was eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of
1986.2
A subsidy achieves its goal only with those recipients who are at
the margin between following or rejecting the subsidized path. Some
people inevitably will receive a subsidy as a windfall because they
would have taken the preferred action without a subsidy. A recipient's
windfall is the government's inefficiency loss, thereby reducing benefit-
cost ratio. s Although this type of inefficiency cannot be eliminated, a
subsidy should be structured to reduce it as much as possible without
causing an unacceptable reduction in total benefits.
Because of wealth or income, many taxpayers are unlikely to be at
the margin of a decision between renting and owning their homes. Their
access to this deduction can be limited or eliminated in several ways.
Property tax attributable to home value in excess of a specified amount,
perhaps $1 million, could be made nondeductible; a ceiling could be im-
posed on the deductible amount; or taxpayers with AGI above a speci-
fied level could be excluded from the subsidy program.
58. See I.R.C. § 1034 (1989).
59. See id. § 121. Because the unlimited exclusion of § 1014 applies to almost all assets, it is
not addressed here as a home ownership preference.
60. See id. § 163.
61. See id. §§ 61 & 262.
62. See 1986 Tax Act, supra note 4, § 201(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2121-22 (changing depreciation
period for residential rental property from 19 years with an accelerated method to 27.5 years with
the straight-line method).
63. Many high-income individuals may react to this housing subsidy, but only by buying a
more expensive home than they would have bought without the subsidy. It is important to deter-
mine if such upgrading is part of the policy goal. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. It
should not be. Hopefully, few congressional members would include as part of the policy goal an
upgrading by high-income homeowners.
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Complete exclusion of high-income taxpayers produces greater effi-
ciency gains because such an exclusion completely denies the subsidy to
the windfall class. Complete exclusion is more complicated than other
proposals, though, because it requires a phaseout mechanism to avoid
the inequity of granting a full deduction to those just below the cutoff
and no deduction .to those just above it. A ceiling, whether on home
value or deduction amount, is simpler in operation, but is less efficient
because it allows a substantial subsidy to the windfall class.
A $1 million value ceiling is attractive because it parallels the 1987
congressional attack on tax subsidies to luxury housing, as evidenced by
the $1 million debt limit for deductible home mortgage interest.6 4 That
approach, however, would produce an undesirable level of uncertainty
and litigation over market values. The debt limit is based on a contrac-
tually agreed and easily determined figure. A $1 million market value
limit would lead to litigation over the value of almost every home with a
value near the threshold. Given generally rising real estate values, any
valuation case won by a taxpayer could and probably would be reinsti-
tuted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) within a year or two. The
$1 million debt ceiling is simply a mechanism to implement the new-
found policy against subsidizing luxury homes; the debt ceiling is not
the policy itself. The policy can be implemented in other areas by other
mechanisms.
A direct limit on the amount of deduction is appealing in its sim-
plicity. Other than the effects of variations in property tax rates, a di-
rect deduction limit resembles a value ceiling, yet avoids federal tax
litigation over home values. A $5000 deduction ceiling and a thirty-one
percent tax rate would limit the subsidy to a maximum of $1550.5 Us-
ing the $1 million debt limit as a guide, an assumed property tax rate of
twenty mills would suggest a $20,000 deduction limit. Perhaps that is as
low as is currently feasible.6 1 If subsidy analysis is the guide, and a defi-
nition of a windfall class of people who are very likely to own homes
even without a full deduction is the goal, a $5000 limit seems more de-
64. A $1 million value ceiling also might seem more attractive than a deduction amount ceil-
ing because it eliminates disparate income tax treatment of owners of equally valued homes that
arises from differences in local property tax rates. In striving to treat equals equally, however, one
first must define equals. The amount of property tax paid is more important than home value in
identifying similarly situated persons for this purpose.
65. A more far-reaching proposal would change the statute from a deduction to a credit, thus
allowing all taxpayers to benefit in equal proportion to their property tax burden. No sound reason
supports giving more housing subsidy to one $2000 property tax payer than to another simply
because the former has a higher income. My proposal, however, is motivated and guided by a view
of the 1987 $1 million debt limit as a depiction of the overlap of theoretical improvement and
political feasibility. This proposal works within the boundaries of that overlap area.
66. See supra note 2 and accompanying text, regarding inflation as an alternative to political
courage.
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fensible than a $20,000 limit.
The desire for even greater subsidy efficiency leads to adoption of
an AGI limit on deductibility of property tax payments in addition to a
deduction amount limit. AGI limits are sufficiently common that tax-
payers and tax return preparers are familiar with their operation.6 7
They require a phaseout mechanism over a modest income range in or-
der to avoid a "cliff effect" that otherwise would cause taxpayers to lose
the entire deduction when a one dollar increase in income pushes them
past the income limit.68
Consider, for example, a rule denying a home property tax deduc-
tion to taxpayers with AGI greater than $250,000 and allowing a $5000
maximum deduction for those with AGI below $200,000. One percent of
the deduction is denied for every $500 increase in AGI above $200,000.
This AGI limit denies the subsidy to a group of people who are unlikely
to be at the margin of a decision between owning and renting. Effi-
ciency of the subsidy and benefit-cost ratio are raised, perhaps
dramatically.
In 1987 approximately 388,000 taxpayers with AGI above $250,000
claimed $2.1 billion of itemized real property tax deductions, producing
revenue losses of approximately $651 million. 9 It is inconceivable that
more than five percent of these taxpayers would have decided to be
renters if property tax were not deductible. At best, therefore, the gov-
ernment spent $651 million to convince 19,400 high-income people to
buy homes ($34,000 per converted tenant). When high cost per recipi-
ent combines with low efficiency, the benefit-cost ratio of a subsidy pro-
gram readily falls below 1:1.
Professor William Hellmuth, writing in 1977, commented:
These tax subsidies [of home ownership] are obviously powerful but inefficient
67. Section 67 of the Code, for example, provides that "miscellaneous itemized deductions"
are deductible only to the extent they exceed 2% of AGI. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1989). In a more direct
analogy to this proposed AGI mechanism, § 219 phases out the right of certain taxpayers, as their
AGI increases from $40,000 to $50,000, to deduct contributions to an IRA. Id. § 219(g). The depen-
dent care credit in § 21 is reduced from 30% to 20% as taxpayer AGI increases from $10,000 to
$28,001. Id. § 21(a)(2). The opportunity to deduct up to $25,000 of certain rental real estate losses
without suffering a § 469 passive loss limitation is gradually denied as AGI rises from $100,000 to
$150,000. Id. § 469(i)(3)(A).
68. Professor Glenn Coven severely criticizes the use of phaseout provisions. See generally
Coven, Congress As Indian-Giver: "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAx REv. 505 (1987). Obviously, I disagree with Coven's conclusion against the
use of phaseouts, but his work sensitizes me to the importance of coordinating the numerous AGI
phaseouts in the Code. The AGI ranges to which such provisions apply should be selected to assure
that no taxpayer will be in more than one phaseout range at a time. In addition, the range of every
AGI phaseout should be of sufficient length to produce an acceptably low surtax rate.
69. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVIcE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASuRY, PUB. No. 304, STATIsTIcs OF IN-
comE-1987 INDIVIDUAL INcoME TAX RETURNs 49 (Table 2.1) (1990) [hereinafter STATISTICS OF IN-
coME]; see infra note 89.
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and inequitable. Other federal housing programs have upper -limits either on the
income of the recipient, the size of the subsidized mortgages, or the value of the
housing unit. There are no limits on the deductions that a homeowner may take for
mortgage interest and property taxes.
7 0
Although a small step in the right direction has since been taken, as
evidenced by the $1 million debt limit on deductible interest,
Hellmuth's unfavorable subsidy analysis of the property tax deduction
remains apt.
VI. RESPONSES TO POSSIBLE COUNTERARGUMENTS
Several counterarguments to this proposal should be addressed.
First, one must consider the complexity introduced by any proposed tax
law change. Most of the 29.5 million taxpayers with AGI below $200,000
and itemized real property tax deductions 1 will be unaffected by this
provision. Those with home property taxes greater than $5000 will ex-
perience only a simple ceiling. The 388,000 taxpayers with AGI greater
than $250,00072 will find their tax preparation slightly simplified by a
complete elimination of the deduction. The 111,000 affected taxpayers
with AGI between $200,000 and $250,0007' will need a one-page work-
sheet to help calculate their partial deduction.
A second consideration is the classic objection that failure to allow
deduction of a tax payment produces a tax on a tax, or double taxation.
While the double taxation assertion technically is correct, the unfair-
ness that it implies is not self-evident. Numerous taxes, both minor and
major, are not deductible in calculating federal taxable income. 4 Objec-
tion to a tax on a tax is of only superficial appeal.
Fairness is one test of a tax burden distribution system. The use of
several types and levels of taxes in our total tax system is immutable.
Comparison, then, is between two multilevel tax systems that are iden-
tical in their components, terms, and revenues raised. One system, how-
ever, allows deductions against the upper level tax for payments to
lower level jurisdictions; the other system, by not allowing these deduc-
tions, produces equal revenue with lower rates.
In shifting from the lower rate system with no integrating deduc-
tions to the higher rate system with these deductions, some taxpayers
will suffer a net tax increase, while others will enjoy a decrease. If fun-
damental fairness requires integrating deductions, this shift inevitably
70. Heflmuth, supra note 6, at 195.
71. STATIsTIcs op INcoME, supra note 69, at 49 (Table 2.1).
72. Id. The cited table combines all taxpayers with AGI from $200,000 to $500,000; therefore,
I have divided that category by linear interpolation from the categories above and below it.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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will produce a fairer allocation of the tax burden. This increased fair-
ness, however, is not inevitable. Consider, for example, two taxpayers
who have identical income and spending patterns, except that Andy
pays $20,000 in property tax, while Becky pays only $5000 in property
tax on her less expensive home and gives the remaining $15,000 to char-
ity, which is deductible. In shifting from a system that does not allow a
property tax deduction to one that does, without changing total reve-
nue, Andy's tax burden will decrease and Becky's will increase.
A third possible counterargument to this proposal is that the wide
variation in property tax levels in different communities will produce
unfair results. To state this objection more candidly, the federal govern-
ment should maintain a subsidy program to reduce differences in prop-
erty taxes borne by high-income homeowners in different communities.
This unfairness, if any, is in the property tax variation, however, and
not in the income tax treatment of property tax payments."5 Differences
in the types of taxes and levels of local service chosen by voters in their
state and local elections account for most property tax variation. 6 The
$1 million mortgage ceiling ignores a similar objection based on wide
variation in housing prices. Congress's refusal to adjust standard deduc-
tion 7 and personal exemption 8 amounts for different locations rejects a
similar argument based on general cost of living variations.
Another objection related to the preceding one is that the real
value of a $200,000 income varies dramatically in different communi-
ties. First, as with a $1 million mortgage ceiling, a $200,000 income
threshold is high enough that taxpayers of modest means will not lose
their deduction. The only valid. aspect of this objection is illustrated
through a scenario in which a $200,000 taxpayer in Nebraska suffers
only a $5000 deduction ceiling, even though that taxpayer is much
richer, in real terms, than a $250,000 taxpayer in New York City who
loses the entire deduction. Second, this objection and the preceding one
are central to a national tax system based on nominal dollar incomes.
Regional differences in dollar value simply cannot be addressed within
bounds of administrative reality.
Qualitative differences between interest and property tax give rise
to a counterargument regarding inequitable results in certain circum-
75. The fundamental problem underlying any thoughtful discussion of a federal deduction
for home property tax is the unfairness of our property tax system as applied to homes. Because
the system is so entrenched that its repair or replacement seems taboo, we struggle blindly with
only the extraneous symptoms of the problem, such as the impropriety of this federal deduction.
76. For example, Oregon has no sales tax, and Washington and Wyoming have no income
tax. TRMASURY I, supra note 17, vol. 2, at 68.
77. See I.R.C. § 63(c) (1989).
78. See id. § 151.
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stances. As mentioned earlier, home mortgage interest and home prop-
erty tax are analogous costs.79 One significant distinction, however, is
that future interest payments are predictable and diminishing, whereas
property tax costs are unpredictable in amount and usually increasing.
Taxpayers with AGI above $200,000 typically can plan to pay off their
home mortgages before they retire, while property tax obligations con-
tinue indefinitely, perhaps with a modest partial exemption for senior
citizens. Nonetheless, the burden caused by a phaseout should be con-
sidered relative to a taxpayer's income.
With a deduction limit based on AGI and beginning at $200,000,
the likelihood that a deduction phaseout will help pressure persons
from their homes is minimal. A person with $200,000 AGI reasonably
might buy a $500,000 home subject to a $10,000 property tax. Deduc-
tion of a maximum $5000 property tax produces a $1550 income tax
saving.80 If appreciation and a rate increase cause the property tax to
triple, and if the taxpayer's AGI increases to $250,000, the $50,000 in-
come increase will be sufficient to bear all additional taxes:
$20,000 Property tax increase
1,550 Lost income tax savings
15,500 Income tax on increase, with no
property tax deduction
$37,050
Although this is not a satisfying way to "spend" a $50,000 raise, it
shows that the deduction phaseout will not force a person to move, even
under extreme circumstances. If a taxpayer's income does not rise,
property taxes alone could force a sale, but the federal rule would not
be a contributing factor.
If this counterargument protests that a home might be lost because
of federal refusal to allow a deduction, as with taxpayers who have AGI
above $250,000 and those who have property tax above $5000, it simply
goes too far. The deduction of utility costs sometimes might prevent the
loss of a home. People who enter a subsidized transaction with knowl-
edge that the subsidy may be withdrawn under certain rational circum-
stances cannot claim to be burdened unfairly when the circumstances
arise and the withdrawal occurs.
An objection will be made by existing homeowners that they relied
on a property tax deduction when they bought their homes. A reliance
argument, in its absolute form, is no longer valid after the frequent,
major changes of the 1980s. The reliance concept in this context was
79. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
80. This assumes a 31% federal income tax rate. See I.R.C. § 1(a).
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borrowed from tort law."' In that original setting, reliance was required
to be reasonable to create a legal right.8 2 Today, reliance on the perma-
nence of any tax rule is not reasonable.
The proposal developed in this Article must be applied to all home-
owners, regardless of whether they purchased their homes prior or sub-
sequent to the proposal's adoption. Otherwise, discrimination of an
unacceptable level and duration will result. In the analogous limit on
home mortgage interest, the permanent grandfathering of pre-October
13, 1987 debt s is objectionable. A similar rule for a property tax deduc-
tion limit would be worse. First, the grandfathering rule would last as
long as persons keep their homes, while the debt protection normally
extends only to the expiration of an existing mortgage. A debt incurred
just before the October 13, 1987 deadline would be grandfathered for its
thirty-year term, but many protected mortgages had substantially less
than thirty years remaining after 1987. Second, the value of a grandfa-
ther rule for interest decreases each year as principal is amortized and
interest charge falls, but the value of a grandfather rule for property tax
normally will increase each year as assessed value and property tax
rates rise.
All that taxpayers can expect is a gradual transition to a new rule.
Although permanent grandfathering of existing homeowners is not ac-
ceptable, a phase-in for them would be reasonable. One simple and eq-
uitable method would be to initiate the ceiling at $30,000 for existing
owners, and then to reduce it to $5000 over a five-year period. In addi-
tion, existing homeowners could be exempted from the AGI phaseout
during this five-year period.
An objection to any deduction limit using an AGI phaseout is its
production of effective marginal tax rates higher than the statutory
rate. Although this is an inevitable effect of an AGI phaseout mecha-
nism, it can be kept within acceptable bounds by adjusting the length
of the phaseout range. Under this proposal, the most severe case will
involve a taxpayer in the phaseout range who pays $5000 or more in
property tax and a thirty-one percent income tax. The phaseout mecha-
nism will increase the taxpayer's effective marginal federal tax rate to
34.1 percent. That rate is less than the marginal rate now borne by a
husband and wife who each earn $50,000 and, thus, is apparently within
the current boundaries for acceptable tax rates.84
81. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 537, 552 (1977).
82. Id.
83. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(D) (1989).
84. Depending on their amount of itemized deductions, this couple probably will pay an
I.R.C. § 1(a) income tax of 31% and (on earned income) a social security tax of 7.65%, I.R.C. §
3101, for a total rate of 38.65%.
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An objection to this proposal may arise because the $1 million debt
ceiling for deductible home mortgage interest reflects a policy of limit-
ing federal subsidies for luxury homes, whereas this proposal focuses
directly on owners' income. A high-income person can avoid the interest
deduction limit by owning a less expensive home, or even by owning a
very expensive home with a mortgage below the ceiling. A high-income
person, however, cannot avoid this proposed property tax deduction
limit by living in a modest home. Rather than simply limiting a federal
subsidy of luxury housing, as the interest limit does, this proposal re-
flects a policy of eliminating a federal housing subsidy to high-income
homeowners. There is, of course, a substantial overlap between the two
affected groups. How many homeowners with AGI greater than
$250,000 pay less than $5000 in home property tax? Members of that
group are the only ones adversely affected by this slight change in pol-
icy focus.
Nevertheless, any high-income taxpayer who lives in a home of
atypically low value will not lose a major tax saving if the deduction is
denied. Subsidy analysis shows that Congress chose a crude tool when it
crafted the interest deduction limit. Allowing any interest or property
tax deduction to an owner of a $1 million home achieves almost no ben-
efit for society. Congress moved in the right direction with its debt limit
in 1987, but a limit based on AGI more effectively promotes the under-
lying goal of increasing the benefit-cost ratio of the subsidy. Further,
the policy goal of preserving low statutory rates in the face of demands
for more revenue is served by eliminating deductions that subsidize
consumption by high-income taxpayers. If a $1 million value ceiling
were imposed on property tax deductions, the new revenue generated
would be insignificant and low rates would remain at risk.
A final popular basis for opposition to a tax increase rests on the
argument that higher income taxes dampen saving and investment.85
That argument is not applicable here because this proposal only im-
poses increased tax on consumption expenditures. That which is de-
scribed as the federal income tax is actually a hybrid system composed
of income tax and consumption tax elements. Income tax elements pro-
duce double taxation of savings and thereby reduce the incentive to
save, leading to the economic argument described above. Consumption
tax elements do not detract from the incentive to save. Speaking pre-
85. In economic literature "saving" and "investment" each have a distinct definition, but
unless one subscribes to economist John Maynard Keynes's theory of oversaving, the two terms
can be (and commonly are) addressed jointly in discussions of the effect of taxes on saving and
investment.
86. A consumption tax will lower savings a little because some people will reduce their saving
to keep their after-tax level of consumption from falling. If revenue from the tax is used to reduce
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cisely, this proposal reduces a consumption subsidy rather than increas-
ing a consumption tax, but the two yield equivalent effects.
Our budget deficit drains funds from private to public sectors,
thereby reducing available capital and increasing capital costs for pri-
vate business. An increased tax on consumption will not lower saving
significantly; therefore, if it is used to reduce the deficit, it will shift
private saving back from the public to the private sector, increasing
available capital and reducing capital costs for private business.
Recent talk of a national Value Added Tax (VAT)87 is premature
and hypocritical as long as the income tax system is still subsidizing
consumption by high-income taxpayers. Before the federal government
starts taxing consumption by middle- and low-income citizens, it
should stop subsidizing consumption by the upper income citizens.
Even without a VAT, a federal housing subsidy for the top 0.5 percent s8
income stratum is indefensible when a debilitating deficit continues and
programs affecting education, drug abuse, the environment, and other
pressing concerns remain seriously underfunded.
With every argument against this proposal, one must return to the
subsidy analysis developed earlier. A housing subsidy for homeowners
with income over $200,000 is costly, the likelihood that such a recipient
will choose to rent upon removal of the subsidy is low, and social bene-
fit from occasionally shifting the recipient from tenant to owner status
is small. Based on 1987 data, this proposal would reduce federal hous-
ing subsidies to high-income homeowners by approximately $711 mil-
lion, allowing that amount to be used for deficit reduction or spent on
programs with greater social benefit.8 9
an existing budget deficit, capital thereby released to the private sector will exceed this savings
reduction, producing a net increase in savings available for investment in the private sector.
87. "Senator Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming, the Republican whip, said a long list of 'revenue
increases' were 'in the mix,' including a national lottery and a value-added tax, a national sales tax
of 1 percent. He said Mr. Bush had not endorsed or rejected any of them. . . ." Rosenthal, Bush
Budget Chief Sounds the Alarm on a Rising Deficit, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
"The cornerstone of my own deficit-reduction plan is a broad-based consumption levy-a
value-added tax-modeled on the VATs that have proven so successful in the European Commu-
nity and across the Pacific Rim." Senator Ernest Hollings, A Way Out of the Budget Quagmire,
Wash. Post, Sept. 4, 1990, at A19, col. 1.
88. STATISTrCS OF INCOME, supra note 69, at 20 (Table 1.1).
89. Id. The United States Treasury's Statistics of Income shows returns claiming itemized
deductions, categorized by AGL Unfortunately, because returns with AGI from $200,000 to
$500,000 constitute a single category, the $200,000 to $250,000 phaseout range used in this propo-
sal cannot be analyzed with certainty. By linear interpolation from the data table relating AGI to
real estate tax deductions, it is estimated that taxpayers in the $200,000 to $225,000 range de-
ducted $202 million. Coupled with assumptions that they all would be in today's 31% bracket and
would lose an average of 25% of their deductions to the phaseout, this group produces an esti-
mated $16 million in additional revenue. Taxpayers in the $225,000 to $250,000 range deducted an




This Article argues that an economic definition of net income does
not allow an income tax deduction for home property tax payments, but
that strong social policies might justify the deduction. Federalism con-
cerns, which are commonly proposed as a justifying social policy, are
reviewed and rejected. A second policy, society's desire for an enhanced
rate of home ownership, is considered and accepted as a legitimate jus-
tification for a deduction. Closer scrutiny of that social policy, however,
reveals that it does not justify the unlimited deduction allowed by cur-
rent income tax law. Significant restrictions on the deduction can be
imposed to reduce its cost in lost income tax revenues, yet still allow it
to promote the goal of high home ownership levels.
This general approach could be applied to all itemized deductions
for personal consumption expenditures in an effort to improve the fair-
ness of and revenue from our income tax without increasing tax rates.
Those who consider today's historically low rates valuable for economic
growth, as I do, should search for ways to remove wasteful subsidies
from camouflaged positions in the Internal Revenue Code.
phaseout, producing revenue of $44 million. Taxpayers with AGI above $250,000 deducted $2.1
billion. Assuming a 31% tax rate, this group will produce $651 million additional revenue, for a
total revenue gain from these groups of approximately $711 million.
The revenue effect of the $5000 ceiling is not estimated here, but probably will be modest. Its
main value in the short run is to minimize the de facto surtax effect of a phaseout mechanism, as
described supra at note 84 and accompanying text. Revenue effects for 1991, of course, would be
substantially larger.
For comparison purposes, when the 1987 Tax Act was in Congress, the adoption of the $1
million debt ceiling was estimated to generate $54 million of additional revenue in 1990. H.R. Con,.
RaP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1024 (1987).
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